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ABSTRACT 
Knowledge acquisition can be quick and easy, formulated in terms of concepts the 
learner already has (knowledge enrichment), or hard, requiring new 
representational resources to be created over years (conceptual construction). 
Previous research suggests knowledge enrichment requires receptive vocabulary, 
whereas conceptual construction requires executive functions (EFs), namely set-
shifting and inhibition. This study investigates whether different domain-general 
cognitive mechanisms support these two types of knowledge acquisition in a new 
domain: learning natural number. Fifty-seven three-year-olds were tested on their 
count procedural knowledge (knowledge enrichment), understanding of the 
cardinal principle (requiring conceptual construction), receptive vocabulary, fluid 
IQ, and EFs (working memory, inhibition, set-shifting). Multiple linear regression 
analyses showed that neither receptive vocabulary, set-shifting nor inhibition 
predicted count procedural knowledge when controlling for age and other predictor 
variables, but working memory did. Logistic regression analyses showed that 
inhibition and exogenous set-shifting significantly predicted understanding of the 
cardinal principle when controlling for age and receptive vocabulary, as did working 
memory. The findings suggest that different forms of knowledge enrichment are 
supported by different cognitive mechanisms (here, working memory and not 
receptive vocabulary). Secondly, set-shifting and inhibition may have a role in 
conceptual construction, but this did not remain significant when controlling for all 
other predictor variables, unlike previous research. Finally, count procedural 
knowledge was the strongest, and only, significant predictor of cardinal principle 
understanding when including all predictors variables in the regression. The 
findings contribute theoretically to the field of knowledge acquisition in a new 
domain and set the stage for future research. 
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Children learn vast amounts within their first few years of life. In some instances, new 
knowledge is quick and easy to learn. For example, new facts may be learned and 
remembered upon first encountering them (Bascandziev, Tardiff, Zaitchik, & Carey, 
2018; Markson & Bloom, 1997), a phenomenon called “fast-mapping” (Carey, 1978). 
This new knowledge is formulated in terms of concepts the learner already has, and 
is the output of what are called “knowledge enrichment” processes (Carey, 2009). In 
contrast, other knowledge only emerges after years of exposure. Frequently, such 
knowledge requires “conceptual construction”, the creation of new representational 
resources that allow thoughts that were previously unthinkable (Carey, 2009). 
Previous research has established that different domain-general cognitive abilities 
underlie knowledge enrichment and conceptual construction. This study explores 
whether this is also the case in learning natural number: the meaning of positive 
integers. 
 
The Conceptual Construction of Natural Number 
Several kinds of evidence establish that acquiring concepts of integers requires 
conceptual construction. First, it is very difficult; concepts of integers arose over tens 
of thousands of years of cultural evolution and arise over years of development in 
children (Carey, 2009). The first system of representation capable of representing 
integers is verbal counting (Carey, 2009). When the count list (“one, two, three…”) is 
applied in one-to-one correspondence with individuals in a set, the last numeral in the 
count list provides a representation of the cardinal value (quantity) of that set. Children 
in numerate societies learn to count around the age of two-years old, yet this is initially 
a meaningless list of words. It takes children another 18-24 months after learning how 
to count to understand the meaning of these numerals, and thus how counting 
represents number (LeCorre, Brannon, Van de Walle, & Carey, 2006; Sarnecka & 
Carey, 2008; Wynn, 1990; 1992). This occurs in a stage-like process with around 3-6 
months between stages. The child first comes to understand the number “one” 
(referred to as a “one-knower”), then “two”, then “three” and sometimes “four”. These 
children are known as “subset-knowers”, since they only understand a subset of their 
count range. After this, children understand the cardinal principle, and are then called 
“cardinal-principle knowers” (CP-knowers), because they understand that the final 
word when counting a set represents the quantity of that set. Coming to understand 
the cardinal principle shows a signature of conceptual construction since it is so 
protracted and difficult to learn. 
 
Second, the best evidence for conceptual construction is an empirically supported 
description of the representational systems before and after the construction, in which 
it is possible to see how the earlier conceptual system cannot express the concepts 
that are represented in the later one. This shows that new representational resources 
must have been created to allow thoughts previously unthinkable. There are two innate 
systems that represent number (Feigenson, Dehaene, & Spelke, 2004). Firstly, the 
Analog Number System (ANS) allows the approximation of magnitudes, for example 
whether one set is larger than another (Dehaene, 1997). These representations are 
ratio dependent according to Weber’s Law. For example, six-month old infants can 
discriminate between sets of 8 versus 16, but not 8 versus 12 (Xu & Spelke, 2000). 
The second system is termed parallel individuation which enables the tracking of up 
to three or four individual objects in working memory. For example, two cats might be 
represented as “cat cat” (Feigenson & Carey, 2003; Trick & Pylyshyn, 1994). Neither 
of these systems, however, can represent positive integers, such as the number 
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“seven”. Firstly, the parallel individuation system does not contain symbols for number, 
only symbols for the individuals. Furthermore, it has an upper limit of three or four. 
Secondly, the ANS representations are approximate and cannot even discriminate 11 
from 12 (Carey, 2004). Since neither innate system can express the representation of 
positive integers, this must require conceptual construction.  
 
Furthermore, adults without a count list, for example monolingual speakers of 
Amazonian languages and Nicaraguan deaf home-signers, show evidence of innate 
number systems but are unable to represent set sizes exactly beyond the range of 
parallel individuation (Gordon, 2004; Pica, Lemer, Izard, & Dehaene, 2004; Spaepen, 
Coppola, Spelke, Carey & Goldin-Meadow, 2011). This provides further evidence that 
the innate number systems cannot represent positive integers and suggests that the 
count list is vital in the conceptual construction of positive integers. 
 
Count Procedural Knowledge – the Product of Knowledge Enrichment 
The above analyses establish that mastery of the cardinal principle is a conceptual 
construction. An essential part of the process is mastery of the count list and the count 
routine, since understanding how counting represents number requires knowing how 
to count. Learning the count routine is not fast-mapped since it takes years for children 
to learn (Wynn, 1990). Nonetheless, learning the procedure of counting draws on 
knowledge enrichment alone, since it draws on cognitive resources even infants have. 
Both infants and non-human primates can learn short arbitrary serial lists (Gulya, 
Rovee-Collier, Galluccio, & Wilk, 1998; Terrace, Son, & Brannon, 2003), and infants 
can carry out the one-to-one correspondence procedure required for counting 
(Slaughter, Itakura, Kutsuki, & Siegal, 2011). 
 
The Learning Mechanisms Underlying Conceptual Construction and Knowledge 
Enrichment 
Having established the differences between conceptual construction and knowledge 
enrichment, the learning mechanisms underlying these should be quite different. 
Carey (2009) characterises a bootstrapping mechanism, “Quinian Bootstrapping”, that 
is implicated in every case of conceptual construction she has analysed. In the case 
of the CP-induction, the child needs both the meaningless count list and the meanings 
of the words “one” to “four”, which draw on resources from the parallel individuation 
system. The CP-induction requires making an analogy between the order of words in 
the count list and the sets labelled “one” to “four”, by noticing that a numeral next in 
the count list and the model next in the series (of “one”, “two”, “three”, “four”) are 
related by adding one (Carey, 2009). The numerals in the count list thus serve as 
placeholder structures that are filled with meaning over time, enabling new 
representational resources to be created. Knowledge enrichment, in contrast, does 
not require Quinian bootstrapping. It is subserved by straight-forward statistical 
learning mechanisms, associative mechanisms, and hypothesis testing mechanisms 
(Bascandziev et al., 2018). 
 
Domain-General Cognitive Resources Supporting Conceptual Construction and 
Knowledge Enrichment 
Further insight into the learning mechanisms underlying conceptual construction and 
knowledge enrichment derives from the investigation of the general cognitive abilities 
each draw upon. Domain-general cognitive resources include executive functions 
(EFs), the abilities underlying fluid IQ, and the abilities underlying lexical learning 
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(verbal learning, or crystallized IQ), as tapped by measures of receptive vocabulary. 
The EFs are a family of top-down mental processes that enable us to pay attention, 
think outside the box, or operate in a non-automatic way (Diamond, 2013). 
Confirmatory factor analysis has identified three core EFs: working memory; being 
able to hold information in memory and manipulate that information; set-shifting, being 
able to flexibly select among relevant sources of information; and inhibitory control, 
being able to inhibit potentially competing responses or representations (Miyake et al., 
2000). EFs are strongly associated with academic ability throughout school (Diamond, 
Barnett, Thomas, & Munro, 2007; Espy et al., 2004; Gathercole, Pickering, Knight, & 
Stegmann, 2004) and are specifically implicated in measures of mathematical 
achievement (Blair & Razza, 2007). It is therefore plausible for them to play a role in 
conceptual construction since this underpins learning in many school subjects (Wiser 
& Smith, 2016).  
 
Indeed, evidence suggests that EFs are required for the conceptual construction of a 
theory of physics (Baker, Gjersoe, Sibielska-Woch, Leslie, & Hood, 2011; 
Bascandziev, Powell, Harris, & Carey, 2016), and theory of mind (Benson, Sabbagh, 
Carlson, & Zelazo; Carlson & Moses, 2001). This is supported by a series of studies 
investigating the construction of a vitalist biology in 5-7 year olds, an episode that 
involves radical conceptual change (Carey, 1985). These studies found that receptive 
vocabulary, a test of knowledge enrichment, predicted mastery of a vitalist biology 
when controlling for age and EFs. However, they also found that EFs, specifically set-
shifting and inhibition, but not working memory or fluid IQ, predicted vitalism when 
controlling for age and receptive vocabulary. This suggests that conceptual 
construction requires more than the accumulation of facts (Zaitchik, Iqbal, & Carey, 
2014; Zaitchik, Tardiff, Bascandziev, & Carey, 2018). Importantly, Bascandziev et al. 
(2018) conducted a biology training study that compared learning the concepts of a 
vitalist biology from a bootstrapping curriculum with learning ten fast-mappable generic 
fun facts about animals. They found that EFs, specifically inhibition and set-shifting, 
predicted the improvement in vitalist biology understanding but not the learning of the 
fun facts. In contrast, measures of knowledge enrichment mechanisms (receptive 
vocabulary) predicted an increase in fun facts, but not vitalism. This double 
dissociation provides evidence that EFs (set-shifting and inhibition) are required for 
conceptual construction, and that learning factual knowledge (knowledge enrichment) 
does not require set-shifting or inhibition, but instead draws on different knowledge 
enrichment mechanisms (receptive vocabulary, in this case). 
 
Performing procedural mathematic tasks, including those using a counting strategy, 
draws heavily on working memory, as shown by studies that deploy dual-task 
paradigms (Cragg, Richardson, Hubber, Keeble, & Gilmore, 2017). Furthermore, 
previous research highlights the importance of working memory as a predictor of later 
procedural mathematic achievement (DeStefano & LeFevre, 2004; Raghubar, Barnes, 
& Hecht, 2010). Counting itself plausibly draws on working memory in younger 
children, since it requires keeping track of where in the count list they are and updating 
this accordingly as new objects are pointed to. Working memory may also be important 
in memorising the count list, because children must monitor what is new information 
(e.g. the next number) to add to their memorised count list. If learning to count requires 
different learning mechanisms than the knowledge enrichment of learning facts, then 
receptive vocabulary may not predict how well children can count, but perhaps a 
different domain-general mechanism, such as working memory, will. 
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The Present Study 
The present study extends the investigation of the role of domain-general cognitive 
abilities in conceptual construction and knowledge enrichment to a new domain, 
numeracy, taking the CP-induction as the case study of the former and count 
procedural knowledge as the case study of the latter. This extends the previous work 
to much younger children, whose EFs are very immature (Anderson, 2002), and to a 
different kind of knowledge enrichment. Besides the theoretical interest of 
understanding knowledge acquisition since the human knowledge repertoire is a 
unique phenomenon on earth (Carey, 2009), understanding the learning mechanisms 
underlying this conceptual construction is also of urgent social importance. Entering 
school without an understanding of the cardinal principle has disastrous 
consequences for children’s subsequent mathematical learning (Geary, 2011; Jordan, 
Glutting, & Ramineni, 2010; Jordan, Kaplan, Ramineni, & Locuniak, 2009).  
 
This study measures children’s count procedural knowledge and understanding of the 
cardinal principle, as well as several domain-general cognitive abilities: fluid IQ, EFs 
(working memory, set-shifting, inhibition) and receptive vocabulary. This study seeks 
to begin to investigate the learning mechanisms that underlie the conceptual 
construction of the integers and the mastery of procedural knowledge of counting. 
 
The study explores three broad hypotheses: 
I. Whether the same domain-general mechanisms implicated in previous 
studies of conceptual construction (set-shifting and inhibition and not 
working memory and fluid IQ) also predict mastery of the cardinal principle. 
If all conceptual construction draws on the same learning mechanisms, they 
should, but since this episode of conceptual construction occurs when 
children are very young, with very immature EFs, perhaps they will not. 
II. Similarly, whether the same domain-general mechanisms implicated in 
previous studies of knowledge enrichment, the acquisition of fast-mapped 
generic facts (receptive vocabulary, and not set-shifting, inhibition, working 
memory, or fluid IQ) also predict mastery of procedural knowledge of 
counting. If all forms of knowledge enrichment draw on the same 
mechanisms, it should, but since the count routine is difficult to master, and 
since counting draws on working memory, perhaps working memory will 
predict count procedural knowledge. 
III. Since mastery of the count list is a necessary prerequisite for mastery of the 
cardinal principle, measures of count procedural knowledge will be strong 
predictors of being a CP-knower.  
 
Method 
Participants 
Sixty-seven children aged between 36 and 48 months (Mage = 41.0, SD = 3.40; 32 
girls) were tested but ten were excluded from analyses because they did not return for 
the second session (n = 6), were extremely distracted during tasks (n = 2) or obtained 
a knower-level of 5 (n = 2), leaving it unclear whether they were four-knowers 
succeeding by chance or CP-knowers failing by chance. The final sample was 57 
children aged between 36 and 47 months (Mage = 40.8, SD = 3.38; 28 girls). 
Participants were fluent English speakers from the Cambridge, MA area, recruited 
from the Harvard University Laboratory for Developmental Studies database of middle 
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and high SES families interested in participating in studies of conceptual development. 
Children received a small toy for participating, and parents were given $5 as travel 
compensation. 
 
Design 
The experiment was an individual difference study, with a correlational design. Testing 
occurred in two 20-30 minute sessions (mean time between sessions = 8.3 days, SD 
= 7.1). The tasks in the number session were administered in the following order: Fast 
Cards, Give-a-Number, Successor Function, Highest Count, Count Routine. Tasks in 
the cognitive resource session were administered as follows: Dimensional Change 
Card Sort, Stroop, Words Forwards, Words Backwards, Odd-One-Out, Receptive 
Vocabulary, Object Assembly, and lastly, Verbal Fluency. Fast Cards, Successor 
Function, Stroop, and Odd-One-Out are not analysed in this paper due to word limits 
or unconventional testing procedures. 
 
Materials and Procedure 
Prior to the study, parents were given a description of the study, the opportunity to ask 
questions, and a consent form to sign. Testing took place in a laboratory testing room. 
 
Number Session (Outcome Variables) 
Give-a-Number (Wynn, 1992; Sarnecka & Carey, 2008) assesses a child’s “knower-
level”. The child was instructed to give a certain number of one type of toy (see Figure 
1) to a stuffed animal on the table (e.g. “can you give “Mr. Lion” two ducks?”) and was 
asked to check their answers for sets of two or more toys. Subset-knowers’ knower-
level was the highest numeral for which they gave the requested number on at least 
67% of trials, and for which they did not give that number of items when asked for sets 
with cardinal values named by other numerals. CP-knowers could create the 
appropriate sets when probed with “one” to “six”. Give-a-Number provides a second 
measure relevant to the distinction between subset-knowers and CP-knowers: what 
children do when asked to check. CP-knowers count, but subset-knowers, for whom 
counting is irrelevant to number representations, do not (LeCorre et al., 2006). 
 
 
Figure 1. Small toys used in Give-a-Number. 
 
Highest Count assesses a child’s procedural knowledge of number by assessing the 
length of their memorised count list. Children were asked to count as high as they can 
to the experimenter (first trial) and to a stuffed animal on the table (second trial). 
Scores were the highest number the child counted to correctly before making an error 
in their count list. 
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Count Routine assesses a child’s procedural knowledge of number by assessing their 
knowledge of the count routine. Children were asked to count a row of toy ducks and 
point as they count. There were three trials which included three ducks in a row (first 
trial), five ducks in a row (second trial), and ten ducks in a row (third trial). Children’s 
mastery of the count routine was scored using a coding schedule. For example, good 
knowledge of the count routine involved saying each number of the count list in one-
to-one correspondence with each duck, whereas poorer knowledge of the count 
routine was reflected by double counting or skipping ducks. 
 
Cognitive Resource Battery (Predictor Variables) 
Dimensional Change Card Sort (Zelazo, 2006) primarily assesses a child’s capacity 
to shift flexibly between rules when cued exogenously and to inhibit currently prepotent 
responses. There were six pre-switch trials in which children were instructed to sort 
cards (see Figure 2) depending on their colour. The experimenter then announced a 
new game and instructed children to sort cards by shape. Each card was labelled by 
its relevant dimension for each trial (e.g. pre-switch trials: “here is a blue one, where 
does it go?”, and post-switch trials: “here is a boat, where does it go?”). A child had to 
correctly sort at least five out of six post-switch trials to pass the task. 
 
 
Figure 2. Target boxes and test cards used in the Card Sort task 
 
Words Forwards (Alloway, 2007) assesses simple working memory span. The child 
was instructed to repeat sequences of words spoken by the experimenter (e.g. “repeat 
after me, ‘two – five – three’”). The experimenter gave one example followed by three 
practice trials with correction and feedback if necessary. Test trials began with two 
words in a row and continued to six words in a row, increasing in length by one word 
on each trial. A child’s forward span was the length of the largest list repeated correctly 
before making errors on two consecutive trials. 
 
Words Backwards (Alloway, 2007) assesses updating working memory. The child 
was instructed to repeat sequences of words said to them in a backwards order. The 
child must maintain the ordered list in working memory, and then operate on this 
memory representation to select the last item, the penultimate item, and so on. Given 
its increased difficultly compared to words forwards, this was modelled twice with a 
puppet (e.g. “when I say ‘horse – pig – duck’, Mr. Lion says ‘duck – pig – horse’, see, 
he said the animals that I said, but in a backwards order”). There were three practice 
trials with correction and feedback if necessary. If a child failed all the practice trials, 
the test trials were not attempted. Test trials ranged from 2-5 words in a row. A child’s 
backwards span was the length of the largest list the child correctly repeated back in 
reverse order before making errors on two consecutive trials.   
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Object Assembly taken from the Wechsler Preschool and Primary Scale of 
Intelligence – Third Edition (WPPSI-III) (Wechsler, 2002), is a normed and 
standardised test of fluid IQ. Only half of the Object Assembly trials were administered 
(even numbered trials) to save time. Previous analyses in the laboratory showed that 
performance on these trials highly correlated with performance on the whole task (r = 
.97, p < .0001). The child assembled seven sets of puzzle pieces into target objects 
(e.g. “these pieces go together to make a hand, put them together as quickly as you 
can”). Each trial ended when the child successfully completed the puzzle, or after 90 
seconds. A child’s score was the total number of correct junctures (the points in which 
puzzle pieces meet, see Figure 3) across all attempted puzzles. 
      
Figure 3. Junctures marked by crosses for “hand” and “star” Object Assembly 
trials. 
 
Receptive Vocabulary (WPPSI-III; Wechsler, 2002), is a measure of the size of the 
child’s lexicon. The words assessed are the output of knowledge enrichment 
mechanisms. Twenty-seven words were probed by asking the child to point to one of 
four images that depicts the meaning of the word (e.g. “point to the butterfly”). 
 
In the Verbal Fluency tasks (Snyder and Munakata, 2010), the child was asked to 
name as many different animals (first trial), then foods (second trial), as they could 
within 30 seconds. Scores were the total number of different, correct items. For older 
children, the task assesses endogenous set-shifting, because the child must monitor 
when a subcategory (e.g. pets) of a focused category (e.g. animals) has been 
exhausted and shift appropriately to a different subcategory (e.g. zoo animals). 
Children this young do not spontaneously use the strategy of systematically running 
through subcategories. However, the task still measures set-shifting and inhibition; the 
child must figure out how to search a huge database for animal or food names, and 
must inhibit the tendency to repeat a name already given. 
 
Results 
First, descriptive statistics for each task are presented, followed by correlations 
between predictor variables and outcome variables to motivate creating composite 
measures. These are followed by a series of regression analyses that test hypotheses 
1-3. To assess which domain-general mechanisms predict count procedural 
knowledge, multiple linear regressions are presented because the dependent variable 
(DV) is continuous (count procedural knowledge). To assess which domain-general 
mechanisms predict CP-knower status, logistic regressions are presented because 
the DV is dichotomous (subset-knower or CP-knower). In all regressions, age and 
receptive vocabulary scores are included to control for overall opportunities for 
knowledge enrichment, since older children have come across more facts, which is a 
major source of variance in receptive vocabulary (Zaitchik et al., 2014). Preliminary 
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analyses ensured no test assumptions for these regressions were violated. Gender 
differences were analysed but gender was not included in further analyses, since most 
research indicates there are no gender differences in EF development in childhood 
(Anderson, 2002). This prevented partialling out natural variance in this small sample. 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
Number tasks. Descriptive statistics for Give-a-Number are shown in Table 1. The 
distribution of CP-knowers and subset-knowers is consistent with the literature for 
children this age, as roughly half are CP-knowers (n = 25) and half are subset-knowers 
(n = 32) (Sarnecka & Carey, 2008). The literature also establishes a qualitative 
difference between CP-knowers and subset-knowers based on their understanding of 
how counting represents number (e.g. LeCorre et al., 2006). Our data are consistent 
with this generalisation, as seen in Table 2. CP-knowers almost always spontaneously 
counted when asked to check the number of toys requested, whereas subset-knowers 
almost never did (Χ2(1, N = 57) = 35.24, p < .0001). These data confirm our designation 
of children as subset-knowers and CP-knowers. 
 
Table 1 
Frequency Table for Give-a-Number 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 
Contingency Table for Knower Status and Counting to Check in Give-a-Number 
  Checking Toys 
  Not Counting Counting 
Knower Status 
Subset-Knowers 29 3 
CP-Knowers 3 22 
 
The descriptive statistics for measures of count procedural knowledge are shown in 
Table 3. Children varied substantially in count procedural knowledge, for example 
memorised count lists ranged from 4 to 20. Children’s knowledge of the memorised 
count list (highest count) and ability to use this (count routine) highly correlate (rs(51) 
= .646, p < .0001). A Count Procedural Knowledge composite measure was therefore 
created by averaging the Z-scores for each task.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Knower Status Frequency 
Subset 1-knower 9 
2-knower 11 
3-knower 9 
4-knower 3 
Cardinal Principle 25 
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Table 3 
Descriptive Statistics for Count Procedural Knowledge Tasks 
  N Min Max Mean SD 
Highest Count 53 4 20 11.40 4.81 
Count Routine 53 0 5 3.14 1.76 
Count Procedural Knowledge 
Composite 
53 -1.52 2.28 0 0.89 
 
Cognitive resource battery. The descriptive statistics of the predictor variable tasks 
are shown in Tables 4 and 5. Children showed poor performance in words backwards, 
with 43 children scoring 0, and only seven children producing a response. 
Performance in words forwards was better, with only three children scoring 0. Since 
examples, practice, and feedback were given for both tasks, the difficulty on the words 
backwards task suggests very poor updating working memory. These tasks reflect the 
immaturity of EFs in three-year-olds. Nevertheless, these measures significantly 
correlate (rs(46) = .399, p = .005) and scores were therefore summed to create a 
Working Memory composite. 
 
Table 4 
Descriptive Statistics for Continuous Measures in the Cognitive Resource Battery 
  N Min Max Mean SD 
Words Forwards 49 0 5  3.47 1.19 
Words Backwards 50 0 3  0.33 0.79 
Working Memory 
Composite 
49 0 8  3.78 1.63 
Verbal Fluency – Animals 53 0 8  2.25 2.17 
Verbal Fluency – Foods 53 0 7  1.66 1.91 
Verbal Fluency Composite 53 0 6  1.95 1.86 
Object Assembly 57 1 17  7.22 4.54 
Receptive Vocabulary 57 5 28 17.14 5.52 
 
Children were also poor at verbal fluency, with 16 children unable to produce a single 
animal name, and 25 unable to produce a food name. Since children this age know 
dozens of animals and foods, that more than a quarter of the children could not 
produce a single name highlights the EF demands of this task. Many three-year-olds 
could not even begin to search their vast knowledge base. These two measures 
significantly correlate (rs(51) = .724, p < .0001), showing that neither animal or food 
names specifically were the problem. A Verbal Fluency composite was therefore 
created by averaging scores from each trial. 
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Table 5   
Frequency Table for Card Sort 
Post-Switch Performance Frequency 
Fail 15 
Pass 40 
 
As seen in Table 5, almost three quarters of the children passed the Card Sort task. 
This performance is much better than expected, since many studies of children this 
age find that less than 50% of 3-year-olds succeed (e.g., Zelazo, Frye, & Rapus, 1996, 
40% pass). 
 
Relations Among Predictor Variables 
Correlations among predictor variables are shown in Table 6. Given the lack of 
significant correlations between EF measures, these were kept as separate measures 
in subsequent analyses. There is a weak, yet significant, correlation between Verbal 
Fluency and Receptive Vocabulary, rs(51) = .287, p = .037. This most probably reflects 
the fact that both tasks draw on lexical knowledge. Verbal Fluency also taps EFs, and 
so these are kept separate in subsequent analyses on theoretical grounds. 
 
Table 6 
Bivariate Correlations Among Predictor Variables 
 
Working 
Memory 
Card  
Sort 
Verbal 
Fluency 
Object 
Assembly 
Receptive  
Vocabulary 
Working Memory – .249† .005 .086 .218 
Card Sort  –  .269† .116  .229† 
Verbal Fluency   – .162 .287* 
Object Assembly    – .003 
Receptive 
Vocabulary 
    – 
Notes: Calculated using Spearman’s Rank Order Correlation due to non-normal 
distribution of data. The number of children who completed each task ranged 
between 49 and 57. Preliminary analyses were consistent with the assumption 
that these are missing completely at random (MCAR) using Little’s MCAR test, 
Χ2(8, N = 57) = 6.645, p = .575. Thus, pairwise deletion is used, meaning the 
number of participants in these analyses ranged from 47 to 57.  
†p ≤ .10, *p ≤ .05, **p ≤ .01, ***p ≤ .001. 
 
Since Object Assembly did not correlate with any of the predictor variables (Table 6), 
or with either outcome measure (Count Procedural Knowledge: rs(51) = .103, p = .464; 
CP-knower status: rpb(55) = .169, p = .209) it is dropped from subsequent analyses. 
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Predictors of Count Procedural Knowledge 
Tables 7-9, display regression analyses that test individually, whether Card Sort, 
Verbal Fluency (measures of set-shifting and inhibition), and Working Memory predict 
variance in Count Procedural Knowledge, when age and receptive vocabulary are 
controlled for. As can be seen in Tables 7 and 8, just as in previous case studies of 
knowledge enrichment, inhibition and set-shifting are not related to Count Procedural 
Knowledge. However, as can be seen in Table 9, unlike the previously studied case 
of fast-mapped generic knowledge, Working Memory does predict Count Procedural 
Knowledge, when age and receptive vocabulary are controlled for (β = .336, p = .016).  
 
Table 7 
Multiple Regression Predicting Variance in Count Procedural Knowledge from Age, 
Receptive Vocabulary and Card Sort 
 B S.E. B β 
Constant -4.713 1.415  
Age  0.120 0.036  .451** 
Receptive Vocabulary -0.027 0.022 -.169 
Card Sort  0.282 0.273  .136 
Notes: adj. R2 = .168, F(3, 47) = 4.370, p = .009 
     †p ≤ .10, *p ≤ .05, **p ≤ .01, ***p ≤ .001. 
 
 
Table 8 
Multiple Regression Predicting Variance in Count Procedural Knowledge from Age, 
Receptive Vocabulary and Verbal Fluency 
 B S.E. B β 
Constant -3.956 1.507  
Age   0.098 0.039  .371* 
Receptive Vocabulary -0.022 0.022 -.135 
Verbal Fluency  0.115 0.070  .238 
Notes: adj. R2 = .215, F(3, 47) = 3.513, p = .002 
   †p ≤ .10, *p ≤ .05, **p ≤ .01, ***p ≤ .001. 
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Table 9 
Multiple Regression Predicting Variance in Count Procedural Knowledge from Age, 
Receptive Vocabulary and WM 
 B S.E. B β 
Constant -4.687 1.378  
Age  0.109 0.036  .414** 
Receptive Vocabulary -0.040 0.023 -.235† 
Working Memory  0.206 0.082  .336* 
Notes: adj. R2 = .283, F(3, 42) = 6.932, p = .001 
   †p ≤ .10, *p ≤ .05, **p ≤ .01, ***p ≤ .001. 
 
 
The only significant predictors of Count Procedural Knowledge, when controlling for 
other variables (Tables 7-9), were Age and Working Memory. To test whether these 
remain significant predictors when controlling for all other predictor variables, a final 
multiple linear regression examined all predictor variables in a single model (see Table 
10). 
 
Table 10 
Multiple Regression Predicting Variance in Count Procedural Knowledge Scores 
from Age, Receptive Vocabulary, Card Sort, Verbal Fluency and WM 
 B S.E. B β 
Constant -3.765 1.645  
Age  0.082 0.044  .309† 
Receptive Vocabulary -0.037 0.025 -.210 
Card Sort -0.023 0.310 -.011 
Verbal Fluency  0.094 0.077  .196 
Working Memory  0.209 0.087  .350* 
Notes: adj. R2 = .275, F(5, 37) = 4.181, p = .004 
   †p ≤ .10, *p ≤ .05, **p ≤ .01, ***p ≤ .001. 
               
Working Memory (β = .350, p = .021) was the only significant predictor of Count 
Procedural Knowledge in the model. For every 1-unit increase in Working Memory 
scores, there is a 0.350 increase in Count Procedural Knowledge scores when 
controlling for all other factors in the model. Receptive Vocabulary did not predict 
Count Procedural Knowledge in any of the regressions presented in Tables 7-10. This 
contrasts with measures of generic factual knowledge that are the output of knowledge 
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enrichment mechanisms (Bascandziev et al., 2018; Zaitchik et al., 2014; 2018). Thus, 
the domain-general mechanisms associated with the mastery of count procedural 
knowledge differ from those that underlie learning vocabulary and generic facts that 
are fast-mapped. Receptive vocabulary predicts variance in generic factual 
knowledge, controlling for age, and working memory does not, where the reverse is 
true for procedural knowledge of counting. 
 
Predictors of CP-Knower Status 
Parallel analyses explored which measures of domain-general cognitive mechanisms 
predict CP-knower status. It was first assessed whether, as in other cases of 
conceptual construction, the measures of set-shifting and inhibition did so. As can be 
seen from Table 11, Card Sort is a significant predictor of CP-knower status (Odds 
Ratio = 7.378, p = .031) when controlling for age and receptive vocabulary. That is, 
the odds of being a CP-knower were 7.4 times higher for those that passed the Card 
Sort than for those that failed. This finding is consistent with the conclusion that the 
conceptual construction that results in the CP-induction draws on the same EFs as do 
older children’s conceptual constructions. However, unlike previous work on older 
children’s theory constructions, Verbal Fluency failed to predict CP-knower status in a 
parallel analysis (Table 12). This may be due to the fact that Verbal Fluency does not 
engage set-shifting in children this young. 
 
Table 11 
Logistic Regression Predicting Likelihood of CP-Knower Status from Age, Receptive 
Vocabulary and Card Sort 
 B S.E. B Wald 
Odds 
Ratio 
95% C.I. for 
Odds Ratio 
Lower Upper 
Constant -16.057 4.783 11.270***    
Age  0.352 0.116  9.208** 1.422 1.133 1.785 
Receptive 
Vocabulary 
-0.007 0.064  0.013 0.993 0.876 1.125 
Card Sort  1.998  0.927  4.650* 7.378 1.200 45.372 
Notes: Nagelkerke’s R2 = .434, Χ2(3, N = 55) = 21.557, p < .0001 
  †p ≤ .10, *p ≤ .05, **p ≤ .01, ***p ≤ .001. Wald df = 1. 
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Table 12 
Logistic Regression Predicting Likelihood of CP-Knower Status from Age, Receptive 
Vocabulary and Verbal Fluency 
 B S.E. B Wald 
Odds 
Ratio 
95% C.I. for 
Odds Ratio 
Lower Upper 
Constant -11.972 4.397 7.412**    
Age  0.277 0.111  6.247* 1.319 1.062 1.640 
Receptive 
Vocabulary 
0.013 0.059  0.049 1.013 0.902 1.138 
Verbal Fluency 0.148 0.186  0.628 1.159 0.805 1.669 
Notes: Nagelkerke’s R2 = .286, Χ2(3, N = 53) = 12.781, p = .005 
   †p ≤ .10, *p ≤ .05, **p ≤ .01, ***p ≤ .001. Wald df = 1. 
 
Another logistic regression tested whether Working Memory predicts CP-knower 
status, controlling for age and receptive vocabulary (Table 13). 
 
Table 13 
Logistic Regression Predicting Likelihood of CP-Knower Status from Age, Receptive 
Vocabulary, and WM 
 B S.E. B Wald 
Odds 
Ratio 
95% C.I. for 
Odds Ratio 
Lower Upper 
Constant -18.968 5.836 10.565***    
Age  0.360 0.130  7.668** 1.433 1.111 1.848 
Receptive 
Vocabulary 
 0.016 0.067  0.056 1.016  0.890 1.159 
Working Memory  1.035 0.443  5.468* 2.815 1.182 6.703 
Notes: Nagelkerke’s R2 = .536, Χ2(3, N = 49) = 25.162, p < .0001 
   †p ≤ .10, *p≤ .05, **p ≤ .01, ***p ≤ .001. Wald df = 1. 
 
Working Memory was a significant predictor of CP-knower status (Odds Ratio = 2.815, 
p = .019) when controlling for age and receptive vocabulary (Table 13), unlike previous 
case studies of theory constructions. For every 1-unit increase in WM scores, children 
were 2.8 times more likely to be a CP-knower. A final difference between the pattern 
of results in the previous studies and this one is that Receptive Vocabulary predicted 
theory construction, controlling for age and EFs, whereas it is unrelated to CP-knower 
status in any of the above analyses. 
 
A final logistic regression assessed whether Card Sort and Working Memory remain 
significant predictors of CP-knower status when controlling for all other predictors— 
Age, Receptive Vocabulary, and Verbal Fluency (Table 14). 
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Table 14 
Logistic Regression Predicting Likelihood of CP-Knower Status from Age, Receptive 
Vocabulary, Card Sort, Verbal Fluency, WM 
 B S.E. B Wald 
Odds 
Ratio 
95% C.I. for 
Odds Ratio 
Lower Upper 
Constant -20.875 7.580 7.584**    
Age  0.381 0.177  4.620* 1.464 1.034 2.073 
Receptive 
Vocabulary 
 -0.033 0.076  0.187  0.968 0.834 1.123 
Card Sort 1.530 1.142  1.793 4.617 0.492 43.320 
Verbal Fluency  0.116 0.258  0.204 1.124 0.678 1.862 
Working Memory 1.162 0.540 4.635* 3.197 1.110 9.208 
Notes: Nagelkerke’s R2 = .614, Χ2(5, N = 45) = 27.756, p < .0001 
   †p ≤ .10, *p ≤ .05, **p ≤ .01, ***p ≤ .001. Wald df = 1. 
 
Age (Odds Ratio = 1.464, p = .032) and Working Memory (Odds Ratio = 3.197, p = 
.031) are significant predictors of CP-knower status when controlling for all other 
factors in the model. For every 1-month increase in age, children were 1.5 times more 
likely to be a CP-knower, and for every 1-unit increase in WM scores, children were 
3.2 times more likely to be a CP-knower. Card Sort did not remain a significant 
predictor when controlling for all other factors in the model.  
 
This is a very different pattern of results from that seen in the studies of conceptual 
construction within vitalist biology. In those studies, like this one, measures of fluid IQ 
(here Object Assembly) did not predict the outcome measure, but in those studies 
working memory did not either. Rather, in those studies, the EFs that predicted 
progress in the conceptual construction were set-shifting and inhibition alone. While 
Table 11 provides some support for the hypothesis, that set-shifting and inhibition are 
required for the transition to CP-knower status, the predictive relation between 
success on Card Sort and CP-knower status controlling for age and receptive 
vocabulary, does not survive the full regression examining which variables predict CP-
knower status when controlling for all other variables. Also, receptive vocabulary does 
not emerge as a significant predictor of CP-knower status in any of the regressions in 
Tables 11-15, unlike the findings concerning construction of vitalist biology.  
 
Count Procedural Knowledge as a Predictor of CP-Knower Status 
Age is a significant predictor of CP-knower status in all of the above analyses. While 
it may seem obvious that older children will be more likely to be CP-knowers than 
younger ones, this fact still calls out for explanation. The above analyses show that 
there is something other than the fact that older children have greater working 
memory, set-shifting and inhibition ability, and accumulated factual knowledge (as 
measured by receptive vocabulary), that is correlated with age and important to CP-
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knowledge. An obvious hypothesis concerning what that “something” is, is Count 
Procedural Knowledge, for the CP-induction simply is understanding how counting 
represents number. Up to now, Count Procedural Knowledge has been used as an 
outcome variable, but will now be used as a predictor variable. A final logistic 
regression tests whether Count Procedural Knowledge is a significant predictor of CP-
knower status, when controlling for all other predictor variables (see Table 15). 
 
Table 15 
Logistic Regression Predicting Likelihood of CP-Knower Status from Age, Receptive 
Vocabulary, WM, Card Sort and Count Procedural Knowledge 
 B S.E. B Wald 
Odds 
Ratio 
95% C.I. for Odds 
Ratio 
Lower Upper 
Constant -19.161 7.696   6.200*    
Age   0.303 0.161   3.536† 1.354 0.987 1.857 
Receptive Vocabulary   0.035 0.089   0.152 1.035 0.870 1.232 
Working Memory   1.300 0.722   3.241† 3.671 0.891 15.121 
Card Sort   1.957 1.263   2.401 7.081 0.596 84.207 
Count Procedural 
Knowledge 
  1.766 0.740   5.688* 5.847 1.370 24.953 
Notes: Nagelkerke’s R2 = .721, Χ2(5, N = 44) = 34.243, p < .0001 
   †p ≤ .10, *p ≤ .05, **p ≤ .01, ***p ≤ .001. Wald df = 1. 
 
When controlling for all other predictors, Count Procedural Knowledge (Odds Ratio = 
5.847, p = .017) was the only significant predictor of CP-knower status. For every 1-
unit increase in Count Procedural Knowledge scores, children were 5.8 times more 
likely to be a CP-knower, when controlling for all other factors in the model. This is 
consistent with the hypothesis that knowledge of the count routine is the major source 
of variance in understanding the cardinal principle. 
 
Discussion 
This study is the first to explore the role of domain-general cognitive resources in 
preschool children’s construction of representations of positive integers. Two 
milestones in the process of integer learning were explored: learning the procedure of 
counting, which requires knowledge enrichment alone, and learning how counting is a 
representation of integers, which requires conceptual construction. Several important 
results emerged from this study. First, there is suggestive evidence that in this domain, 
and at this young age, knowledge enrichment and conceptual construction draw on 
different resources, since the Card Sort predicted the likelihood of being a CP-knower, 
but not variance in Count Procedural Knowledge. Furthermore, the EFs differentially 
implicated in conceptual construction, set-shifting and inhibition, are the same ones as 
in all previous studies. Second, the cognitive resources that predict knowledge of 
counting differ from those shown to be implicated in previous studies of knowledge 
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enrichment such as generic factual knowledge. Receptive vocabulary alone predicts 
knowledge enrichment in previous studies, but here, working memory, and not 
receptive vocabulary, predicts procedural knowledge of counting. Third, the domain-
general mechanisms that predict progress in constructing a representation of integers 
also differ in an important respect from those involved in previously studied conceptual 
constructions; here working memory, as well as set-shifting and inhibition, was an 
even more important predictor of conceptual construction, whereas working memory 
does not predict conceptual construction in previous studies. Finally, as in previous 
studies, the output of knowledge enrichment mechanisms has an important role to 
play in conceptual construction. The likelihood of being a CP-knower is predicted by 
Count Procedural Knowledge, when controlling for every other predictor variable and 
age, and no other predictor variables reached significance in this analysis. 
 
Predictors of Count Procedural Knowledge 
This study provides the first evidence that there may be different learning mechanisms 
supporting different types of knowledge enrichment. Working memory (WM), as 
opposed to receptive vocabulary, predicted Count Procedural Knowledge. WM is 
needed for the procedure of counting itself, like in the task where the child must count 
a row of ducks. Children must keep track of where in the count list they are and update 
this in one-to-one correspondence with successively counted objects. Furthermore, 
when learning the memorised count list, an ability tested by the highest count task, 
children must monitor for new information to add to their memorised list, thus drawing 
on WM. 
 
Unlike previous case studies of knowledge enrichment (Bascandziev et al., 2018; 
Zaitchik et al., 2014), receptive vocabulary did not predict variance in Count 
Procedural Knowledge. These previous studies of knowledge enrichment concern 
learning facts that can be fast-mapped. For example, generic facts like “the ears of 
crickets are on their legs” and idiosyncratic facts like “my grandmother gave me this 
purse” (Bascandziev et al., 2018; Markson & Bloom, 1997). Lexical knowledge of the 
sort measured by the Receptive Vocabulary task is also fast-mapped; all of these 
measures of fast-mapped verbal knowledge are highly intercorrelated, and probably 
reflect verbal learning mechanisms that are highly constrained by structural knowledge 
of language (Bascandziev et al., 2018). Learning the count routine, however, is very 
different. Learning to count takes years of practice, as evident by the short count lists, 
the limited ability to enumerate objects, and variance of counting ability in this sample 
of three-year-olds.  
 
Count Procedural Knowledge as a Predictor of CP-Knowledge 
This study found that the only significant predictor of being a CP-knower was variance 
in count procedural knowledge, when controlling for all other predictor variables. That 
understanding how counting represents number (CP-induction) depends on how well 
a child can count and enumerate, is unsurprising. Knowledge that is the output of 
knowledge enrichment has many necessary roles to play in conceptual construction, 
and this is particularly clear in the present case. The bootstrapping process proposed 
to underlie conceptual construction involves explicit symbols which act as placeholder 
structures. In the case of constructing representations of the positive integers, the 
placeholder structure is the count list of verbal numerals (Carey, 2009). In this 
bootstrapping process, the child must notice that successive numerals among “one”, 
“two”, “three”, “four” refer to sets that are related by +1, and induce that all successive 
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numerals in the count list are so related (Carey, 2009). If a child has poor count 
procedural knowledge, her ability to notice that all successive numerals in the count 
list are related by +1 may be reduced, since the placeholder structures may not be 
stable. For example, if the child’s count list changes then the relations among 
placeholder structures cannot be consistently explored. 
 
That Count Procedural Knowledge predicts CP-knower status may explain the finding 
that Working Memory predicts CP-knower status. When controlling for all other 
cognitive resource predictor variables, only WM is a significant predictor of the CP-
induction and similarly, WM is the only significant cognitive resource predictor of Count 
Procedural Knowledge. Thus, it is possible that the variance in WM predicting CP-
knower status is mediated by Count Procedural Knowledge, since WM is the strongest 
predictor of Count Procedural Knowledge, which is the strongest predictor of CP-
knower status. Future research with a larger sample could test this by running a 
mediation analysis. The conceptual construction resulting in a count list representation 
of integers may therefore differ from previous studies (e.g., Baker et al., 2011; 
Bascandziev et al., 2018; Zaitchik et al., 2014) in not drawing on EFs in the 
construction process itself.  
 
However, these data also suggest that procedural knowledge of counting as the sole 
predictor of CP-induction may not be the whole story. Card Sort, measuring inhibition 
and set-shifting, predicts the likelihood of CP-knower status, but not variance in Count 
Procedural Knowledge, even when controlling for age and receptive vocabulary. This 
is consistent with previous research that suggests that conceptual construction, but 
not knowledge enrichment, is predicted by measures of set-shifting and inhibition 
(Bascandziev et al., 2018; Zaitchik et al., 2018). This inference in the present case is 
arguably weak, since Card Sort does not remain significant when controlling for all 
other predictor variables, possibly because Card Sort and CP-knower status are two 
dichotomous variables, or because Card Sort marginally correlates with Working 
Memory. Since Working Memory is a strong predictor of CP-knower status in the full 
regressions, variance in Card Sort may be partialled out. Nevertheless, it still survived 
controlling for age and receptive vocabulary, which given this small sample and that 
both variables are dichotomous, is a strong result. There are multiple possibilities as 
to why inhibition and set-shifting may be involved in the CP-induction. 
 
Firstly, set-shifting, or cognitive flexibility, as measured by the Card Sort, has been 
linked to the ability to think abstractly. It is possible that the conceptual construction of 
the cardinal principle requires abstract thinking since the meaning of positive integers 
are themselves abstract concepts. For example, Kharitonova, Chein, Colunga, and 
Munakata (2009) tested three-year-olds on the Card Sort and added novel cards after 
the post-switch phase. These novel cards were similar to test cards on their abstract 
rule (colour or shape). Children were instructed to sort novel cards using whichever 
rule they had used in the post-switch phase. They found that only children who passed 
the Card Sort could sort these novel cards, and that children who failed the Card Sort 
could not sort novel cards using any rule. They concluded that children who pass the 
Card Sort generate rules based on abstract representations (colour/shape), whereas 
those who fail generate rules based on stimulus specific rules (e.g. red ones go here). 
Kharitonova and Munakata (2011) extended this work and found that successful Card 
Sort switchers generalised this abstraction to a third unrelated dimension. This 
suggests that set-shifting relates to an ability to think abstractly, potentially necessary 
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for the CP-induction. For example, if a child generates abstract rules about the verbal 
numerals (e.g. all numerals are part of a single count list), then her ability to notice 
relations among these numerals, necessary for the bootstrapping process, may be 
enhanced since the count list is viewed as a unified whole rather than just a series of 
individual words. 
 
Secondly, the role of EFs in the conceptual construction of the CP-induction may be 
related to analogical reasoning. The prefrontal cortex (PFC) underlies executive 
functioning (Bunge & Zelazo, 2006; Diamond, 2013) and has also been found to 
support integrating abstract information to form analogies, or abstract relations 
between items or categories (Badre, Kayser, & D'Esposito, 2010; Green, Fugelsang, 
Kraemer, Shamosh, & Dunbar, 2006; Speed, 2010). Furthermore, Richland and 
Burchinal (2013) found that four-year-olds’ composite EF skills and inhibitory control 
were significant predictors of verbal analogy skills at 15 years old. The bootstrapping 
process underlying the CP-induction involves the child making an analogy between 
the words in the count list and the models of set sizes “one” to “four” by noticing that 
a numeral next in the count list and the model next in the series are related by adding 
one (Carey, 2009). It is possible that this analogy, which forms part of the conceptual 
construction of number, draws on cognitive processes, such as inhibition, subserved 
by the PFC and measured by the Card Sort. 
 
Practical Implications 
Understanding learning mechanisms underlying the CP-induction is important for 
educational practice. Preschool numeracy skills that reflect learning the cardinal 
meanings of verbal numerals predict later mathematic achievement, and entering 
school without understanding the cardinal principle is detrimental to future mathematic 
ability (Geary & vanMarle, 2016; Jordan et al., 2009; 2010). The present study 
suggests limitations in working memory capacity may be one source of children’s 
failure to understand how counting represents number by the time they enter primary 
school. Furthermore, inhibition and set-shifting may also be needed for the CP-
induction. EFs are malleable and can be trained, even in pre-schoolers, using a 
curriculum such as “Tools of the Mind” (Diamond et al., 2007). Thus, improving 
children’s EFs could facilitate readiness for conceptual change. This would be 
especially useful for children from low-income families, who have disproportionately 
poor EFs and sometimes enter primary school without understanding the cardinal 
principle (Geary, 2011; Noble, McCandliss, & Farah, 2007). 
 
Strengths and Limitations of the Present Study 
A limitation of this study, and of all the studies to date investigating the role of EFs in 
conceptual construction and knowledge enrichment, is that they have been carried out 
on children from middle- and high-income households. Future research investigating 
the role of EFs in the CP-induction should be done in lower-income samples. Research 
suggests the development of mathematical concepts differs between lower- and 
middle-income backgrounds (Starkey & Klein, 2000), highlighting the importance of 
future research in diverse samples. 
 
Furthermore, the sample size of 57 is small considering the number of predictors 
analysed. Tabachnick and Fidell (2007) advise a sample size ≥50+8M where M is the 
number of explanatory variables. Since the maximum number of predictors in 
regressions was five, this guideline recommends at least 90 children for this study. 
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Moreover, not all children completed every task, reducing the number of children in 
some regressions even further. It is possible this study therefore did not have enough 
power to detect smaller effects in the data and is a reason why the laboratory is 
continuing this work with a sample size four times the size, half from the same 
population and half from low-income populations. Despite this obvious limitation, the 
data show enough variance in every measure (each was correlated with at least 
something else) and the sample size was large enough to provide preliminary results 
with respect to the hypotheses. 
 
A major limitation of this study is its correlational nature. Finding significant correlations 
between predictor and outcomes variables does not provide evidence of causal 
relationships between them. It is possible there is a common factor underlying the 
variation in both number knowledge and domain-general learning mechanisms. One 
possibility could be quality of the child’s learning environment. However, this 
suggestion can be partially ruled out, since analyses controlled for receptive 
vocabulary, which measures general input from the environment, an accumulation of 
factual knowledge. Another possible explanation for the correlations between predictor 
and outcome variables is that measures of number knowledge are driving EF 
development. The direction of influence could be explored using training studies which 
test whether individual differences in domain-general cognitive abilities predict 
improvements from an episode of learning, involving either knowledge enrichment or 
conceptual change (Bascandziev et al., 2016; Bascandziev et al., 2018). Future 
training studies in the domain of number are therefore needed. Nevertheless, these 
correlations set the stage for future research. 
 
This study also cannot rule out the possibility that EFs are needed solely for the 
expression of existing knowledge necessary to complete tasks, rather than for 
conceptual construction. For example, the Give-a-Number task likely requires EFs, for 
example holding the requested numeral in working memory, and inhibiting the 
response to grab toys or guess. This could explain the correlations between Card Sort 
and WM with Give-a-Number. However, that WM and Card Sort correlate with Give-
a-Number simply due to task demands can be partially ruled out, since knower-status 
categorisation from Give-a-Number is consistent with tasks that require very different 
processing demands (e.g. Gelman, 1993; LeCorre et al., 2006; Wynn, 1990). For 
example, LeCorre et al. (2006) used a puppet task which did not require children to 
count, thus minimizing processing demands, and found remarkable consistency with 
Give-a-Number: subset-knowers failed the puppet task, whereas CP-knowers robustly 
succeeded. Since data from Give-a-Number in this study reflect the qualitative 
difference found in the literature, it is likely that a different task with fewer EF demands, 
such as the puppet task, would still produce the same categorisation of subset-
knowers and CP-knowers.  
 
A wide range of tasks was administered which is a strength of this study, since many 
different domain-general cognitive mechanisms could be analysed. Furthermore, 
these predictor variables were analysed with respect to two different outcome 
variables (the procedure of counting, and how counting is a representation of integers). 
This provides a broader picture of the domain-general cognitive mechanisms required 
for learning number. The measures of number knowledge are also reliable, since the 
Count Procedural Knowledge composite was formed from two tasks, and data from 
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Give-a-Number strongly replicated the qualitative difference between subset-knowers 
and CP-knowers in the literature. 
 
Conclusions 
Despite some limitations, this study is the first to assess the domain-general 
mechanisms supporting knowledge enrichment in a new domain: count procedural 
knowledge. Unlike previous case studies of knowledge enrichment that involve generic 
factual knowledge that can be fast-mapped, receptive vocabulary did not predict count 
procedural knowledge, but working memory did, suggesting that different forms of 
knowledge enrichment are supported by different cognitive mechanisms. It is also the 
first study to assess the domain-general mechanisms supporting conceptual 
construction in a new domain: the meaning of natural number. Count procedural 
knowledge was the strongest predictor of this conceptual construction, and possibly 
the reason working memory correlated with being a CP-knower. However, this may 
not be the whole story, since inhibition and exogenous set-shifting predicted CP-
knower status, but not count procedural knowledge, when controlling for age and 
receptive vocabulary. This, like previous case studies of conceptual construction in 
other domains of knowledge, suggests that inhibition and set-shifting have a role in 
conceptual construction. The findings make important theoretical contributions to the 
field of knowledge acquisition and set the stage for future research investigating the 
learning mechanisms that support the conceptual construction of number. 
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